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Since 9/11, federal funds directed toward public healthdepartments for training in disaster preparedness havedramatically increased, resulting in changing expectations
of public health workers’ roles in emergency response. This
article explores the public health emergency responder role
through data collected as part of an oral history conducted with
the 3 health departments that responded to Hurricane Katrina in
Mississippi and Louisiana. The data reveals a significant change
in public health emergency response capacity as a result of
federal funding. The role is still evolving, and many challenges
remain, in particular, a clear articulation of the public health role
in emergency response, the integration of the public health and
emergency responder cultures, identification of the scope of
training needs and strategies to maintain new public health
emergency response skills, and closer collaboration with
emergency response agencies.
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In the early hours of August 29, 2005, Hurricane
Katrina made landfall with winds up to 145 m/h in the
City of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama causing the death of more
than 1800 people, catastrophic destruction to prop-
erty, and the temporary and permanent displacement
of hundreds of thousands of people including the en-
tire New Orleans metropolitan area and surrounding
parishes. Within hours, the levees protecting New Or-
leans breached, flooding the city. Along with the rest of
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the city, the health care and public health infrastructure
of the area was devastated. Though much has been writ-
ten about the role of federal, state, and local emergency
response agencies, little is known about the role of the
state and city health departments in these events.1-3
Hurricane Katrina placed tremendous strain on the
public health systems of the Gulf Coast region of
Louisiana and Mississippi. The actions of the state
health departments in Mississippi and Louisiana, along
with the City of New Orleans Department of Health
(CNODH), were critical in the management of this pub-
lic health disaster. Working side by side with tradi-
tional emergency response agencies (Emergency respon-
der is defined by the US Department of Homeland Secu-
rity as those individuals, including emergency response
providers, who, in early stages of an incident, are re-
sponsible for the protection and preservation of life,
property, evidence, and environment) including fire,
police, and emergency medical workers, public health
workers themselves undertook emergency responder
roles. To better understand the role of public health
in emergency response, an oral history was conducted
with representatives of the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals (LDHH), CNODH, and the Mis-
sissippi State Department of Health (MSDH). This ar-
ticle examines the public health emergency responder
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role in Hurricane Katrina, public health workers’ accep-
tance of the role, and the challenges they experienced
in carrying out these responsibilities.
Public health departments have historically played
a role in responding to emergencies, particularly in the
management of infectious disease outbreaks through
the delivery of mass immunizations, often in collabo-
ration with local health partners.4,5 As a consequence
of the terrorist attacks on New York City in September
2001, expectations of the public health workers’ role
have greatly expanded. Public health workers are now
considered an integral part of the community-level
emergency response system.6,7
In 2002, the Columbia Center for Health Policy,
Columbia University School of Nursing developed
public health worker competencies for emergency
response.8 Subsequently, a group of federal, state, and
local public health experts were asked to assess to what
degree state and local public health agencies performed
the identified competencies.8 In the opinion of these
experts, public health agencies were under- or unpre-
pared in some critical emergency response competency
areas: (1) well-developed emergency response plans,
(2) knowledge of agency mission and their specific
roles in emergency response, (3) knowledge of the In-
cident Command Structure ([ICS] the national organi-
zational structure for emergency response), (4) round-
the-clock response, and (5) collaborative partnerships
with other emergency response agencies. Since that
time, the training of public health workers has dramat-
ically increased nationally.7 A study conducted in 2004
of 2300 local public health departments revealed that
92% had participated in emergency preparedness drills
or exercises, 71% had assessed workforce competencies
for preparedness, and 87% had provided preparedness
training to staff.9 Salinsky and Gersky10 suggest that
despite the increase in funding and training, the level
of funding has not been sufficient to support the ad-
ditional burden on local health departments. There is
an urgent need to know how public health workers are
functioning in this new role and how to best meet the
challenges they may be experiencing.
● Methods
Oral history has previously been utilized as a tool in
public health research most recently with the New
York City Department of Health in 2002 following the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
the subsequent anthrax investigations.11,12 An oral his-
tory is a systematic collection of personal accounts and
observations by participants in a specific event. The
story is told by the participants in their own words.
The researcher begins with a central question or issue
that guides the collection of data; however, that ques-
TABLE 1 ● Participants by Agency and Organizational
Level
                                                        
LDHH MSDH CNOHD Total, N (%)
Senior management 6 4 4 14 (31.8)
Middle management 10 8 2 20 (45.4)
Line staff 4 3 3 10 (22.7)
Total 20 15 9 44 (100)
Abbreviations: CNOHD, City of New Orleans Health Department; LDHH, Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals; MSDH, Mississippi State Department of Health.
tion is likely to evolve over time as more data becomes
available. This approach allows researchers to docu-
ment events and identify themes as they emerge natu-
rally from the data, provides opportunities to examine
the interface between organizational and environmen-
tal issues, and allows for historical data to be gathered
for future research.
● Sample and recruitment
Leaders of the 3 health departments directly involved in
responding to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Mis-
sissippi were contacted by the investigators about the
study and agreed to participate. A purposive sample
of key public health leaders and managers was identi-
fied using organizational charts provided by the state
and local health departments. These individuals were
selected on the basis of their knowledge of the strategic
and tactical decisions and actions taken by their de-
partments in response to Hurricane Katrina and, in a
number of cases, were involved in their pre-Katrina de-
velopment as well. This sample consists mainly of se-
nior leadership and management along with a smaller
sample of line staff who were directly involved in re-
sponding to the emergency. It is not intended to be a
representative sample of all public health providers but
fairly reflects those in the agencies who could provide
information related to the goals of the study. Leaders in
each agency informed those identified that they would
be contacted by one of the investigators. From June to
November 2006, 44 of the 50 identified public health
staff were contacted, agreed to participate, and were in-
terviewed. The remaining 6 individuals identified for
the study were no longer working at the health depart-
ments and were not reachable by phone. Table 1 de-
scribes the agency affiliation and organizational role of
44 participants. Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals represented the largest group of participants
(N = 20), followed by MSDH (N = 15) and CNOHD,
the smallest agency (N = 9). The agency sample size
reflects the number of individuals in each agency who
were directly involved in the response. The study was
described to potential participants as an oral history
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being conducted to better understand the role of pub-
lic health in responding to disaster that would become
a permanent record of these historic events and be
available in local universities for future studies. Partic-
ipants were told that they would receive a copy of the
transcribed interview to review for accuracy of tran-
scription. After completion of the review, they would
have the option of depositing the transcribed document
and audiotape to a Hurricane Katrina Oral History
repository. The study was reviewed by the institutional
review board of Columbia University and New York
University and deemed exempt as an oral history.
Data collection
An interview guide organized around topic areas re-
lated to the study goals was used to conduct the oral
history. Participants were asked to recount their experi-
ence in the disaster beginning with when they became
aware of the storm and later as events unfolded. Spe-
cific roles and responsibilities of the individuals and
the department during the initial disaster and in the
weeks and months that followed were explored. Par-
ticipants were asked about prior disaster training and
experience and existing agency emergency policies and
procedures (chain of command, communication role).
Study investigators conducted and audiotaped all in-
terviews, approximately 1 to 1 12 hours in length.
Data analysis
Audiotaped interviews were transcribed verbatim and
sent to participants for review. Participants made mi-
nor changes to the transcripts such as spelling of proper
names and clarification of words the transcriber could
not clearly hear. The research team then conducted an
initial review of the narrative data to identify broad ana-
lytic themes related to the study’s goals. Thematic anal-
ysis of narrative data is designed to systematically iden-
tify relatively comprehensive topics present in the text
and the specification of relationships that exist among
these themes or between themes and contextual factors.
Core codes, secondary codes, and a final codebook were
developed as the investigators engaged in an iterative
process with the data. All interviews were coded and
entered into a database utilizing the qualitative data
analysis software ATLAS.ti 4.2 (Atlas ti Scientific Soft-
ware Development GmbH, Berlin). A random sample
of 20% of transcripts was then independently coded
by a second coder. Interrater agreement on codes was
excellent (>90%).
● Results
Proximity to the Gulf Coast where hurricanes are a com-
mon occurrence has provided frequent opportunities
for each health department to play a role in emergency
response. Participants from all 3 health departments re-
ported that until the mid-1990s, their role was largely
to insure environmental health such as monitoring the
safety of water, food, and sewage disposal in times of
disaster. In the late 1990s, all 3 departments began to
take a major responsibility in caring for vulnerable pop-
ulations in “special needs shelters.” These shelters were
created to safeguard individuals with chronic illnesses
whose care needs exceed the capacity of the general
shelter system, but who do not require hospitalization.
Public health workers (mainly nurses and physicians)
set up and staff these shelters where they provide med-
ical as well as supportive care to those seeking shelter.
As this oral history of Hurricane Katrina demon-
strates, the public health emergency responder role
has increased significantly as a result of the attacks of
9/11. Data presented next demonstrates public health
workers’ perspectives on 2 overarching themes that
emerged from the data related to the public health emer-
gency responder role: (1) The role of public health has
changed since 9/11 and is still evolving and (2) there
are significant challenges to the adoption of the new
emergency responder role for traditional public health
professionals.
The role of public health has changed since 9/11
and is still evolving
More than 90% of participants, both leaders and line
staff, described changes in the expectations for pub-
lic health workforce as a result of the attacks of 9/11.
Federal funding to increase capacity for public health
emergency response was specifically directed toward
preparedness for bioterrorism. These state and local
health departments expanded on that mandate to adopt
an all hazards approach as they believe, practically, that
they are more likely to experience a natural disaster
than a bioterrorism event. The infusion of federal fund-
ing to build public health capacity for disaster response
has been a significant factor driving change in the pub-
lic health role. The formalization of the role of state
public health departments in the emergency response
system has also been a catalyst for change. Although
some emergency response functions are similar to rou-
tine core public health activities—such as surveillance,
vector control, and environmental quality assurance
and regulation—many functions represent either new
responsibilities or new roles for public health, particu-
larly when the conventional providers of those services
are either overwhelmed by the disaster or absent. These
new responsibilities include either assurance or direct
provision of medical equipment and supplies, victim
identification and mortuary services, veterinary ser-
vices, patient evacuation, worker health safety, and the
direct provision of clinical care and mental health care.
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The formalization of these functions significantly ex-
panded the role of public health departments in emer-
gency response. A senior official at LDHH described
the impact of the post-9/11 role expansion on the pub-
lic health workforce:
And when 9/11 came it added further to our public
health roles in disasters and those kinds of events. . ..
Certainly 9/11 made that clearer to folks so there was a
lot of emphasis in how do you get people to start
thinking differently about their roles in public health, to
move beyond preventing the spread of disease to
perhaps being emergency responders. There is just [a]
huge difference.
Strategies to increase emergency response capacity
In response to these challenges the 3 health depart-
ments engaged in 2 different strategies to increase pub-
lic health emergency response capacity: (1) extensive
training of existing workforce including disaster simu-
lation exercises and training in the Incident Command
Structure and (2) recruitment of new staff with tradi-
tional emergency response experience.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals uti-
lized new federal funding to support workforce devel-
opment through extensive training and limited recruit-
ment of new staff with emergency response experience.
As a result of those efforts, the emergency response ex-
pectations for the public health workforce in Louisiana
are widely understood and accepted. An LDHH senior
social worker described the staff expectations:
It’s a rule, it’s policy. I mean no one is exempt. We all
have to report in the event of a disaster.
This participant explained that there are some dif-
ferences among public health workers in their un-
derstanding of what it means to be a public health
emergency responder noting that nurses, the largest
group of professionals in the public health workforce,13
and others who have designated emergency re-
sponse roles have the clearest understanding of their
responsibilities.
When new federal disaster preparedness funds be-
came available after 9/11, MSDH primarily used funds
to increase state-level emergency response capacity
through recruitment of traditional emergency response
professionals. A senior official with the MSDH Office
of Health Protection recruited emergency response co-
ordinators for each of the 9 public health districts in
Mississippi. He reflected on this approach
. . .I didn’t go hire public health people to be the
emergency response coordinators. I went and either got
police officers, firefighters, paramedics, an ex-military
person, someone that was used to responding and then
trained them in public health instead of the other way
around. And I tell you it was probably a very good
decision, because those people are public servants in an
emergency, or have served as public servants in an
emergency and they have helped public health people
understand that role.
This strategy provided a highly trained emergency
response leader in each district. However, traditional
public health staff were less familiar with the emer-
gency response role. Federal funding was used to train
MSDH Central Office staff in the Incident Command
Structure and specific staff were oriented to the Strate-
gic National Stockpile (federal program providing es-
sential medications to supplement state and local public
resources during an emergency) but few, especially at
the district health office level, had extensive formal dis-
aster preparedness training. In the central office of the
health department in Jackson, one midlevel manager
stated:
We were prepared from the standpoint of knowing that
we had to work in teams. We had established those
teams and a lot of that worked well during Katrina,
knowing the stockpile folks. We weren’t prepared for
what we went through. And I don’t know if anybody
could ever be that prepared. We could have been better
prepared.
Another official in Office of Emergency Planning and
Response at MSDH described the tremendous efforts
of public health workforce in responding to Hurricane
Katrina despite limited training in emergency response.
We mobilized about 1400 of our 2400 or so employees
from Davidson, virtually all of which were acting
outside of their knowledge base, and did so for the
most part very graciously. We’re thankful for that. I
would say less than 100 had actually had disaster
preparedness training.
Similar to the other health departments, the
CNODH had responsibility for staffing the special
needs shelter for a number of years prior to Hurricane
Katrina. As a local health department, they received
a modest amount of federal funds to increase capac-
ity for emergency response that went primarily toward
training in the Incident Command Structure and devel-
oping emergency response protocols. Senior staff had
participated in disaster simulation exercises and had a
clear understanding of the emergency responder role.
Among line staff, many long-time health department
employees, some were less comfortable in adapting to
the public health emergency responder role. When con-
tacting staff to report to the Superdome where the spe-
cial needs shelter would be set up, several participants
described reticence on the part of some staff to report for
duty:
So many people I called were adamant that “I’m not
going to do special needs.”
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TABLE 2 ● Challenges to Adoption of the Public Health
Emergency Responder Role Across Health Departmentsa
                                                        
Domains LDHH MSDH CNOHD
Cultural differences x xx x
Public health/emergency response skills
differences
xxx xxx xxx
Integration of public health and emergency
response systems
Internal x xx x
External xx x xx
Barriers to ER role adoption (physical,
social, and administrative)
xx x xxx
Abbreviations: CNOHD, City of New Orleans Health Department; LDHH, Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals; MSDH, Mississippi State Department of Health.
aNumber of “x” reflect participants’ description of problem severity: x = minimal,
xx = significant, xxx = considerable.
There are significant challenges to public health
adoption of the emergency responder role
About two-thirds of participants from all 3 public health
departments identified significant challenges for pub-
lic health workers in integrating public health and dis-
aster response roles. Four subthemes of this overarch-
ing theme were identified: (1) traditional public health
and emergency response represent distinct cultures;
(2) some different skills or competencies are required
to carry out these roles; (3) differences in culture and
skills present challenges to integration of the 2 roles;
and (4) public health workers may experience physi-
cal, social, and administrative barriers to performing
emergency response roles. Table 2 compares the degree
to which the subthemes described next differed across
the 3 health departments.
There are differences in the cultures of public health and
emergency response
More than half of the participants in all 3 agencies re-
ferred to the evolution of the public health emergency
response role as a culture change. For those who had
spent much of their public health career in primary pre-
vention activities, the functions of emergency response
were very different, as is the pace of the work and a
“24/7 versus a 9 to 5 expectation.” A senior nurse at
LDHH described this new role as a culture change:
What I think when I say it “changed the face of public
health,” primarily we were looking at our core
functions. . .looking at public health programs and
providing those services. And when you bring in
emergency preparedness into the mix. . .and now you
tell public health nurses who have been in the clinics
working. OK, now it’s our duty to respond, and now
you have to respond, it’s this new public health
preparedness role, you know it was a culture change.
TABLE 3 ● Core Competencies for Traditional Public Health
and Traditional Emergency Response Professionals
                                                        
Traditional Traditional
Public Health Professional Emergency Responder
Assess data relevant to public
health
Hazard identification
Develop public health programs and
policies
Hazard mitigation
Communicate effectively and with
cultural competence with general
public, communities, and
organizations
Direction, control, and coordination
of disaster response
Apply state-of-the-art public health
science, leadership, and
management knowledge and
skills to public health practice
Conduct emergency response
exercises, evaluate and develop
corrective action plans
Responsible for the health of the
public
Responsible for continuity of
operations and government
Several participants noted the difficulty of concep-
tually integrating the public health and emergency re-
sponder roles describing it as “still muddled” for many
people. An LDHH physician and senior administrator
described efforts of the department to prepare public
health workers for new emergency response expecta-
tions and the challenge of internalizing the role.
I think the problem often is that they don’t necessarily
feel in their day to day life, like emergency responders
. . . I think that the same people that man the public
health units . . . they weren’t necessarily the people that
know how to be emergency responders.
Different skills and competencies are required to carry out
public health and emergency response functions
About 50% of the participants in all 3 health depart-
ments described differences in skills needed to carry
out their public health and emergency response roles.
Table 3 illustrates the core competencies for traditional
public health workers14 compared with those for tradi-
tional emergency responders.15 Core public health com-
petencies include assessment of data relevant to pub-
lic health; development of public health programs and
policies; effective and culturally competent communi-
cation with the general public, communities, and orga-
nizations; and the application of state-of-the-art public
health science, leadership, and management knowl-
edge and skills to the conduct of public health practice.
Core competencies for traditional emergency respon-
ders are hazard identification, risk assessment, and im-
pact analysis; hazard mitigation; direction, control, and
coordination of emergencies; conduct of emergency re-
sponse exercises; and evaluation of those efforts and
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plans for corrective action. Traditional emergency re-
sponders are also responsible for continuity of opera-
tions and continuity of government. Although there are
important overlapping skills required for fields such
as management, leadership, and communication abili-
ties, the primary focus of the core competencies is dif-
ferent. One key distinction is the focus and timeframe
for achieving outcomes. Public health activities such
as health promotion and disease prevention efforts are
typically implemented within a longer timeframe to ap-
propriately engage affected communities and organiza-
tions in the planning process. In contrast, most emer-
gency response activities require an immediate action,
though the planning for them can involve a longer time-
frame as well. The greatest area of overlap between the
2 fields is the area of public health disease monitoring
and control, where immediate response to outbreaks
is required, responsibilities that are core to the public
health mission.
The differences in substance and approach of pub-
lic health and emergency response professionals are re-
flected in the observations of an LDHH nurse and senior
official:
Emergency response staff are a certain type of people.
Public health people are a certain type of people. And
they’ve been able to come to the table, but when you
look at this kind of disaster, all right, you need EMS,
you need emergency responder kind of people, you
need very dynamic people who can, and I’m not saying
that public health don’t have those kind of people, but
that’s not what they’re used to doing . . . EMS people.
This is what they do every day. They have that
adrenaline. They’re used to any and everything.
Integrating public health and emergency response systems
may present challenges internally and externally with
emergency response agencies
In Mississippi, a midlevel administrator for the coastal
public health district most impacted by the storm de-
scribed the difficulties experienced in working within
the agency where the emergency response functions
were carried out separately from the traditional public
health functions. The administrator was familiar with
the health district and thus could provide important
information to the Forward Command (local arm of
the state ICS) team deployed to the area by the health
department. However, this administrator was also re-
sponsible for reopening the health clinics to meet the
needs of the storm survivors in the area.
I basically had two full time jobs . . . and you certainly
shouldn’t have two jobs in an Incident Command
System and you shouldn’t have two ways you are
trying to do things. . .. Forward Command worked
entirely separately from public health as a day to day
function so it was just really hard to do both and they
should have been meshed, if there’s a way, they need to
mesh closer somehow even if that means putting
Forward Command in the District Office so that you
can be part of it but separate from it.
In contrast, the MSDH emergency response teams
had fewer challenges in working with external tradi-
tional emergency response agencies. A senior official
in the Office of Emergency Planning and Response de-
scribed the federal resources that were made available
to the state immediately after the storm and what facil-
itated the acquisition of those resources:
I can tell you why we were able to access those assets.
The reason is, we knew who to talk to that has these
assets. We knew where the assets were, what the
capability was so they could be appropriately assigned
and the people and the management that came with
them were friends of ours colleagues, we were on a first
name basis. . . .
This official noted, however, that the public health
role in emergency response was not consistently un-
derstood by all response agencies. For example, he de-
scribed the problems that arose when fuel access was
extremely limited after the storm:
We had issues at the local level where our health care
workers were not considered first responders. And so
the priority for fuel and transportation, as well as
everything else that was afforded to emergency
responders, was in many cases not afforded to the
health community.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and
CNODH experienced fewer challenges within their
own agencies in integration of public health and emer-
gency response functions but encountered some chal-
lenges with external traditional emergency response
agencies. For example, LDHH officials in attempting to
send resources into the disaster area encountered barri-
ers from state and federal emergency response agencies:
We were sending teams in, search and rescue like EMS
teams and they were getting turned away. I guess there
were state police or National Guard guarding the road,
they weren’t letting them in.
City of New Orleans Department of Health experi-
enced challenges in the Superdome where communica-
tion with traditional emergency response agencies was
at times lacking or very difficult. A senior clinician de-
scribed her frustration at the lack of response to her
requests for assistance from some of the military units
assigned to the Superdome.
I would talk to the Generals, the Colonels . . .I could
never get a sense that my message was getting to the
right people. I needed some men to help move cots (for
patients). I didn’t have enough Health Department staff
to do it. . .they said they would call but nothing ever
happened. Other than a few people it was very difficult
to get anything done.
Copyright © 2010 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
LWW/JPHMP PHH200193 September 23, 2010 15:23 Char Count= 0
E22 ❘ Journal of Public Health Management and Practice
These external interagency barriers appeared to
emerge where there was a lack of awareness or un-
derstanding of the public health emergency response
role on the part of traditional emergency responders. In
Louisiana, the public health emergency response was
lead by senior public health officials with considerable
emergency response experience. Louisiana Depart-
ment of Health and Hospitals participants’ extensive
emergency response training and experience with the
Incident Command Structure may have reduced the
problems of integration of public health and emergency
response activities within its own agency but not nec-
essarily to external emergency response agencies.
Public health workers may experience physical, social, and
administrative barriers to being emergency responders
Aging of the public health workforce and the po-
tential impact on the field of public health has been
widely documented.16-18 These concerns were articu-
lated by several participants. A few raised concerns
about the ability of the aging public health workforce
to take on the strenuous physical burden of function-
ing as emergency responders. A senior nurse at LDHH
described the consequences of the extraordinary de-
mands on public health nurses responding to Hurricane
Katrina.
You know, our workforce is an aging workforce and I
think the mindset of our older nurses was like—OK this
is enough for me—and this was the final straw that
broke the camel’s back. And that was . . .we’ll call it
quits after this. And so we’ve had a lot of our older
workforce to early retirement.
Family demands were also identified as challenges
for some public health workers to respond in an emer-
gency. A quarter of participants described situations in
which public health workers were either exempt from
responding to emergencies or were resistant because
they had not made plans for their families in the disas-
ter. One CNODH official described the barriers nurses
experienced in reporting for duty at the Superdome:
Dr. Stevens had declared every employee essential but
some of them were single parents, some of them had
husbands that were in police and fire so they were
exempt, some of them had elderly parents that they had
to take care of so they were exempt from really
reporting.
A few participants spoke about the administrative
challenges to paying public health workers for respond-
ing in an emergency noting the lack of policies on over-
time payment.
Another thing is that people who responded. . .were
paid from the city. I’ll use myself as an example. I came
out, I worked, I’m a salaried person. Because the city
had nothing in place, I was paid seven hours a day
whether I was working around the clock or not. And
then those people that did not show up at work at all
[were] paid seven hours a day and they didn’t have to
endure anything. I have said you have got to put
something into place to compensate those people who
are making things happen.
As Table 2 illustrates, there were clear differences
across the 3 health departments in the degree to which
they experienced challenges to integration of the pub-
lic health and emergency response roles. In general,
LDHH and CNODH faced similar challenges, although
CNODH experienced greater physical and social chal-
lenges to workers reporting for duty as a result of hav-
ing a smaller workforce and fewer resources. Chal-
lenges to integration of the 2 roles were greater at the 2
state health departments because of their larger scope
of responsibilities and the need to operate within the
complex organizational network of state, federal, and
voluntary agencies. As noted earlier, although the gap
in skills between traditional public health and emer-
gency response workers was great in both, the 2 agen-
cies have taken very different strategies to address it
resulting in better integration with external agencies in
Mississippi and greater internal agency integration in
Louisiana.
● Discussion
Between 2002 and 2005, training of public health work-
ers to increase capacity for emergency response in-
creased exponentially. A study conducted in 2002 found
that public health staff at all levels were underprepared
to respond in an emergency in 5 areas: (1) availabil-
ity of well-developed emergency response plans, (2)
knowledge of agency mission and individual specific
roles in emergency response, (3) knowledge of the ICS,
(4) round-the-clock response capacity, and (5) devel-
opment of collaborative partnerships with other emer-
gency response agencies.8
This article exploring the public health emergency
response role in Hurricane Katrina reveals, in the opin-
ion of the participants, significant progress in some
emergency response competency areas and the need
for more work in others. Progress in each of the 5 com-
petency areas is described next.
1. All participants at the 3 agencies report having emer-
gency response plans that are known to the partici-
pants and available within the agencies.
2. More than 90% of participants described their un-
derstanding of the agency’s role and their individual
role in emergency response, although some partici-
pants believe that line staff within their agencies are
not as knowledgeable. More than half of the par-
ticipants described the challenges to public health
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workers of adopting this new role that requires a dif-
ferent set of skills from those needed to carry out their
usual responsibilities and insufficient opportunity
to practice and reinforce new emergency response
skills as a contributing factor. Some recent literature
supports this observation noting that emergency re-
sponse skills are highly specialized and require re-
inforcement through regular practice.10 Others have
pointed out the need for a clearer understanding
of the scope of training required to achieve pub-
lic health emergency response competency.4 Given
the current climate of decreased federal funding for
emergency response training and severely limited
state budgets, it is essential to identify the optimal train-
ing required to achieve competency and strategies to sus-
tain those skills.
3. About 80% of participants were familiar with proto-
cols and terminology of the ICS. Most indicate that
they believe other agency staff are also familiar with
ICS terminology though it is less clear whether they
are familiar with other protocols related to emer-
gency response. For example, many participants
were familiar with the Strategic National Stockpile
as a federal resource during an emergency but pro-
tocols for vaccination of the general population after
the hurricane were lacking.
4. Progress has also been made in the public health
workforce’s ability to respond to a round-the-clock
demand. All study participants report being pre-
pared for round-the-clock response and in many
cases report that this expectation is well understood
by the entire workforce. There are exceptions to this
finding, however. Some participants indicate that not
all agency staff are prepared for this response as a re-
sult of personal barriers such as family responsibili-
ties, personal health, or physical incapacity. In other
cases, perceived lack of skills to carry out assigned
emergency response functions are inhibiting factors.
These findings are consistent with those of Barnett
and colleagues6 who stress the importance of ad-
dressing family, personal, and environmental safety
concerns of public health workers to reduce what
may be an inaccurate perception of risk. They sug-
gest that public health workers may be unclear about
what is expected of them and the importance of their
contribution to emergency response. The safety con-
cerns and role expectations of public health workers as
well as barriers to their ability to respond round-the-clock
in an emergency should be carefully assessed by agen-
cies and clarified in job descriptions. Where legitimate
exceptions to round-the-clock response expectations
are needed, they should be communicated within the
agency. There is a need for well-developed agency-level
policies and procedures regarding the scope of responsi-
bility for the public health emergency responder role.
5. The competency area where many participants re-
port room for improvement is establishing collabora-
tive relationships with other emergency response agencies.
The integration of public health into statewide ICS
is now well established; however, the role of pub-
lic health in emergency response is reportedly not
well understood by the other responders, according
to many participants. The most common difficulty
occurred when public health officials were attempt-
ing to get much needed medical and other supplies
into New Orleans and were stopped on the high-
ways and not allowed to proceed. Several partici-
pants referred to the intense experience of this dis-
aster as providing opportunities for other response
organizations to learn what public health contributes
to the response effort. In Mississippi, emergency re-
sponse public health officials interacted effectively
with federal emergency response agencies; how-
ever, they encountered difficulties at the local level.
These findings support those of several other stud-
ies where lack of role clarity across agencies impact
interagency collaboration and inhibit effective re-
sponse. Tierney’s1 report on the lessons of Hurricane
Katrina described the urgent need for clarification
of the roles of the different emergency response or-
ganizations and all levels of government. In their
recent study of planning efforts for pandemic flu,
Avery and colleagues19 identified the lack of role clar-
ity among public health, emergency management,
and health care officials as a significant barrier to
effective emergency response. Finally, Salinsky and
Gersky10 suggest that the lack of a clearly defined
national public health emergency response model is
a significant barrier to effective coordination with
other emergency response agencies.
This oral history provides important information
that bridges the gap between the generic public health
emergency response competencies and the reality of
the public health workforce experience as emergency
responders in this “real world” event. It is now clear
that the field of public health has a critical role in emer-
gency response, particularly following their designa-
tion in 2005 as the agency responsible for coordinat-
ing with the Federal Emergency Response System for
Health and Medical Issues (ESF-8). As the study here
reveals, however, the role is still evolving. The inter-
face of public health and emergency response cultures
presents challenges to both that should be acknowl-
edged and addressed. Former Deputy Health Commis-
sioner for New York City, Benjamin Mojica, MD, noted
following the 2001 terrorists attacks there, “Historically
there have been significant challenges to integrating the
cultures of public health with that of the OEM (Office
of Emergency Management).20 These result from the
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nature of the mission of each agency. Public health
must always be focused on the larger population is-
sues while emergency responders are concerned with
the health and safety of the individual” (Oral communi-
cation, 2008). Despite the differences in foci, the 2 fields
share a common mission of protecting the health and
safety of their community.7
The study illustrates 2 primary strategies that have
been applied by health departments in Louisiana and
Mississippi to build emergency response capacity:
(1) training of public health professionals in emergency
response procedures and (2) recruitment of traditional
emergency responders into public health settings.
Mississippi State Department of Health and LDHH
have utilized both strategies in combination with a
greater emphasis on one or the other in each state. These
strategies are important initial steps in building work-
force emergency response capacity but do not appear to
be sufficient to bridge the public health and emergency
response cultures at this point in time. The data sug-
gest that continued research is needed to identify the most
effective structural strategies for integration of the 2 pub-
lic health functions. Clear guidelines and expectations are
needed for the emergency response roles of traditional public
health workers that are consistent with their skills and train-
ing. Not every public health professional will be able
to assume the range of emergency response activities
now expected.
The data corroborate concerns that have been raised
by others that increased demands on an aging work-
force may accelerate the public health workforce
shortage.16,18 It is estimated that among the current
workforce almost 50% will be eligible for retirement
in the next few years.17 Experts have warned that the
increasing demands on the public health workforce
resulting from disasters such as 9/11 and Hurricane
Katrina are compounded by the aging out of these pro-
fessionals over the next 5 years.17 There is no easy so-
lution to this issue. Careful assessment of older pub-
lic health workers may clarify whether they would be
more willing to take on emergency response functions
with sufficient training to increase confidence in their
ability to carry out the role or whether their role should
be a more limited one. Turnock4 points out that pub-
lic health emergency response competencies were in-
tended to augment basic public health competencies
but to date there has been little progress in creating
a common framework that fully integrates both types
of skills. In fact, the most recent version of core public
health competencies makes minimal reference to public
health emergency response competencies.4
Recruitment of new public health professionals must in-
clude clear expectations and training for their emergency re-
sponse roles. Emergency responders recruited into pub-
lic health also need to be educated about the public
health environment and its primary mission. Tradi-
tional public health professionals and emergency re-
sponders need ongoing training and opportunities to
train together to more fully understand their roles and
find areas for collaboration. An integrated training ap-
proach will increase their effectiveness and decrease the
potential for the development of parallel rather than in-
tegrated systems of emergency response. Development
of collaborative relationship with other emergency re-
sponse agencies as discussed earlier is also critical to
bridging the cultural gap.
Finally, it is important to note that following the
initial post-9/11 infusion of funding to expand public
health emergency response capacity, both federal and
state funding have continued to decline over the last
several years while public health responsibilities have
increased.17 These funding reductions coupled with the
responsibility for provision of medical care to vulner-
able populations pose a serious threat to public health
emergency response capacity that must be addressed
by policy makers. There is a danger of continued expan-
sion of public health responsibilities without adequate
resources, diluting the ability to carry out core public
health functions.10
The study has a number of limitations. As with all
oral histories, the data presented is subject to the failings
of the participant’s memory, self-serving motives, dif-
ferences between the spoken and the written word, in-
accurate perceptions of the participants, and the power
relationship between the interviewer and the partici-
pant. The data presented here are self-reported opin-
ions of those who responded to Hurricane Katrina. In
addition, participants are largely senior and middle
management officials in the health departments respon-
sible for responding to the emergency. To address theses
limitations, the analysis of the data focuses on points of
agreement among multiple sources while noting areas
of disagreement. The ability to identify common themes
across 3 different health departments lends credence to
the findings. Though findings can not be generalized,
the data offer insights and suggestions for strategies to
strengthen emergency response competencies among
public health workers.
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